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John Bligh

The Doctrinal Premises of Hogg's
Confessions of a Justified Sinner

Since 1924, when Andre Gide announced that he had r e a d ' s
masterpiece "with a stupefaction and admiration that increased
at every stage," the Confessions of a Justified Sinner has
received a generous measure of critical attention. 1 No one,
however, has had much to say about its doctrinal implications.
This present essay will attempt to establish that the novel is
meant to reveal the dangers inherent in the Antinomian form of
Christianity, and that its innovative narrative technique is
designed to control the reader's response so that he will hate
Antinomianism but will pity (not hate) its adherents. The
novel will be shown to rest upon two theological premises--not
one, as has been commonly supposed: in addition to the Antinomianism derived from St. Paul's Epistles, Hogg uses a popular demonology not derived from St. Paul; and his attitude to
his two premises is widely different: he uses the demonology
as a means of showing up the dangers of Antinomianism, but, as
he completes his work, he has serious misgivings about the use
he has made of it.
The popular form of Christianity which the novel seeks to
discredit can be called, for brevity's sake, Antinomianism
(from the Greek ~~mos, law), but more accurately it is Antinomian Predestinationism, which teaches that the Christian
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elect, predestined to eternal glory and
ied by their
faith, are so
and unconditionally predestined that
no breach of any law can imperil their final salvation. The
propagators of this doctrine presented it as the correct interpretation of the gospel preached by St. Paul. One reason
why Hogg's novel is of permanent and universal interest and
deserving of a place among "The World's Classics" is that it
explores obscure areas of the thought of St. Paul, who is of
permanent and universal interest. The story is not just a
light-hearted satire on Calvinism, like Burns's "Holy Willie's
Prayer"; it is a serious examination of strands of St. Paul's
thinking which have always appealed to men and women who have
tried and failed to live up to the exacting demands of
Christian
These strands constantly reappear in
of the Christian
as a proclamation of freedom from law can of course be interpreted in a
wholesome sense (if read in the context of the whole New Testament canon), but, as Hogg shows, when isolated and overemphasized, it lends itself with the greatest of ease to an
interpretation which is subversive of morality and social
order. The book is much more than a satire on an early eighteenth-century Scottish misunderstanding of Calvinism (indeed,
if satire treats its object as matter for
, it is not
a satire at all); it reveals dangerous tendencies in Pauline
Christianity itself. The only critic who has shown awareness
of this is
Gifford, who argues that the novel highlights an "intrinsic weakness of Christian
," but even he
does not explain this weakness in any detail.
To understand the novel correctly, it is necessary to know
how St. Paul came to make the statements out of which the
Antinomians constructed their system. The great debate in
which the
of the Gentiles (as he calls himself) worked
out his own
position concerned the treatment of
Gentiles converted to Christianity: vfuen they became Christians by baptism, should they at the same time become Jews by
submitting (if males) to circumcision and by undertaking
(whether males or females) to obey the Jewish law? Implicit
in this practical question was the wider issue: Should Christianity remain, as it began, a movement within Judaism, or
should it break through the wall of the Jewish law and become
, stripped of its Jewishness? Embracing the
a world reI
latter view, Paul proclaimed that "Christ is the end of law
unto
for everyone who believes" (Rom. 10:4).3
Paul made no distinction between the laws of Rome and the laws
and the
of Moses, nor between the moral laws of the
ceremonial laws about eating kosher food,
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offering of first fruits, etc. He proclaimed in general terms
that believers in Christ live not under law but under grace
(Rom. 6:14); that law is not the remedy for sin; and that Jew
and Gentile alike are "justified" (or freed from sin and made
just in God's sight) not
law but by faith in Christ.
Paul's opponents
ask, "What, then, was the purpose of the law of Moses?" He replies polemically: "the law
entered that the offence
abound. But where sin abounded,
grace did much more
(Rom. 5:20). That is to say: Law
(personified) entered the human world, not to prevent sins but
to multiply them, and by so doing to lay the scene for an even
greater display of the grace of God. Paul's opponent replies:
"What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin, that grace
may abound?" (Rom. 6:1). The opponent is not an Antinomian; he
is a law-observing Christian who is trying to refute Paul's
teaching by revealing its absurd implications (later, Antinomians did not think the
absurd). Paul's next
reply, instead of
the matter up, seems to entail a
further absurdity. "Heaven forbid!" he says; "you have been
baptized into Christ's death so that you may live in grace,
not die in sin; therefore you must yield yourselves unto God,
as those that are alive from the dead, and your members as
instruments of
unto God. For sin shall not have
dominion over you: for you are not under the laUJ~ but under
grace" (Rom. 6:13-14, my emphasis). To the law-observing opponent this last clause sounds even worse. "What then? [he
retorts] shall we sin, because we are not under the law but
under grace?" (Rom. 6:15). It is a reasonable objection: i f
a Christian is no
under law of any kind, presumably
what was previously forbidden him by law is no longer forbidden him; according to Paul's own principles, "sin is not imputed when there is no law" (Rom. 5:13). Since Paul has not
distinguished between the
and the ritual law, it may
well seem to follow that a Christian can kill his enemy, sleep
with his neighbor's wife, take his property, damage his good
name, and so on, without transgressing any law or incurring
any penalty; whatever his conduct, he will remain a justified
sinner by reason of his faith. The objections which the opponent is allowed to voice in Romans 6:1 and 6:15 are designed
by Paul to give him an opportunity to refute them. Each time,
however, the answer leads to fresh difficulties.
The essential tenet of Antinomianism, that one who is
justified by faith is no
subject to law or to its
penalties, is
combined with the doctrine of predestination which Paul uses in the same Epistle in his attempt to
assure the Christian believer that once justified by faith he
can face the final
with complete security:
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And we know that all things work together for
good to theD that love God, to them who are the
called according to his purpose.
For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son,
that he might be the firstborn among many brethren.
Moreover whom he did predestinate, them he
also called: and whom he called, them he also
justified: and whom he justified, them he also
glorified.
wbat shall we then say to these things? If
God be for us, who can be against us?
(Rom. 8: 28-31)
Paul later qualifies this seemingly limitless assurance by
allowing that there is one thing which can cause a Christian
to be "cut off" and rejected, namely, lack of faith. At
present, he says, the Jews are cut off for lack of faith;
Gentile Christians too will be cut off if they abandon their
faith (Rom. 11:20-22).
By putting together Paul's unqualified polemical utterances
about law, grace, justification by faith, and predestination,
one can easily reach the conclusion that a sinner who has been
justified by his faith cannot, properly speaking, sin at all,
and so long as he holds fast to his faith in his O,,'I1 predestination, his final salvation is certain. One of St. Paul's
defects as a thinker and teacher is that he does not draw the
conclusions entailed by his own theoretical premises and becomes irate with others who do. He was proud to iJroclaim that
in Christ "there is neither slave nor free, there is neither
male nor female" (Gal. 3:38); however, when Corinthian females
set aside the veils that were the symbols of their servitude
to their husbands, he promptly told them to put them back on
again (cf. I Cor. 11:2-16). Though liberal in his speculative
theology, he was extremely conservative in h1.s social thinking. 4
At one point in the novel, Robert Wringhim's servant Penpunt makes the observation that Satan "has often been driven
to the shift of preaching it [the gospel] himself, for the
purpose 0' getting some wrong tenets introduced into it, and
thereby turning it into blasphemy or ridicule" (p. 196). But
this is not quite accurate. The Antinomian does not need to
introduce any tenets of his own; he has only to select from
St. Paul, to omit certain distinctions and qualifications
which Paul himself omitted, and from the selected passages to
draw inferences which Paul himself did not draw.
For the historical setting of his novel, Hogg chose a peri-
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od at the beginning of the eighteenth century when the
presbyterian Church of Scotland was seriously disturbed by an
outbreak of Antinomianism. The General Council of the Church
of Scotland in 1720 condemned a book called The Marr01;)
Modepn
• which was believed by some presbyters to
propogate Antinomianism. 5 Such was not the intention of its
author, Edward Fisher; however, in a dialogue between three
characters called Evangelista (representing Fisher), Nomista
and Antinomista, the Antinomist is made to describe how he was
converted to Antinomianism by the preaching of Evangelista
(who is not altogether pleased with this compliment). He
says:
After that I had been a good while a legal professor,
just like my friend Nomista, and heard none but
your legal preachers, who built me up in works and
doings, as they did him and as their manner is; at
last a familiar acquaintance of mine, who had some
knowledge of the doctrine of free grace, did commend you for an excellent preacher; and at last
prevailed with me, to go with him and hear you;
and your text that day I well remember was, Tit.
iii. 5: Not
the works of
that

we had done,
saved us; whence you observed, and plainly proved,
That man's own righteousness had no hand in his
justification and salvation; whereupon you dehorted
us from putting any confidence in our own works
and dOings, and exhorted us by faith to lay hold
upon the righteousness of Jesus Christ only: at
the hearing whereof it pleased the Lord so to work
upon me, that I plainly perceived that there was
no need at all of my works and doings, nor nothing
else, but only to believe in Jesus Christ. And
indeed my heart did assent unto it immediately;
so that I went home with abundance of peace and
joy in believing, and gave thanks to the Lord, for
that he had set my soul at liberty from such a
sore bondage as I had been under. And I told all
my acquaintance what a slavish life I had lived
in, being under the law; for if I did commit any
sin, I was presently troubled and disquieted in
my conscience, and could have no peace till I had
made humble confession thereof unto God, craved
pardon and forgiveness, and promised amendment.
But now I told them, that whatsoever sins I did
commit I was no whit troubled at them, nor indeed
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am not at this day; for I do verily believe, that
God, for Christ's sake, hath freely pardoned all
my sins, both past, present, and to come: so that
I am confident, that what sin or sins soever I
commit, they shall never be laid to my charge,
being very well assured, that I am so perfectly
clothed with the robes of Christ's righteousness
that God can see no sin in me at all. 6
Besides being a good statement of the Antinomian position,
this passage helps us to understand its popularity: Antinomianism offers relief from spiritual anguish to those who
find that though baptized they remain enslaved to sinful
habits.
In 1824, when the novel was published, The MarroUJ was still
in use. In 1823, Joseph Cottle, the friend of Coleridge and
Southey, was moved to publish a book called Strictures on the
Plymouth Antinomians, in which he says "the evil [Antinomianism] has increased and is increasing." The "great patron and
apostle of the creed" was a certain Dr. Hawker of Plymouth who
in 1822 preached to "a spacious Church thronged to the ceiling"; sometimes his audience included hundreds of "charity
children.,,7 Hogg is therefore dealing with a form of popular
Christianity which was still very much alive at the time of
writing. The novel contains an interesting study in abnormal
psychology; this, however, is introduced not for its own sake
but as an example of the evil effects of embracing Antinomianism.
The second theological presupposition of the novel is the
belief that the devil can impersonate human beings both living
and dead. (Impersonation is not, of course, the same as possession.) This belief is not derived from St. Paul. He does
indeed say that his law-observing opponents and critics are
agents of Satan, and that Satan disguises himself as an angel
of light
Cor. 11:13-15), but he does not say that Satan
disguises himself as a human being and appears among men as a
teacher. Belief in demonic impersonations is derived from
other sources, to be discussed below.
In the novel, when Robert Wringhim first encounters GilMartin, he meets a demonic impersonation of himself (pp. 1167). While Robert is confined to his room for a month, the
figure who is always at George's right-hand side is presumably
a demonic impersonation of Robert (p. 37). On later occasions,
Gil-Martin impersonates Thomas Drummond and the dead George in
the presence of Bell Calvert.
There are, however, in the novel other phenomena of a
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similar kind which are not to be explained as demonic impersonations. After Robert has entered into possession of Dalcastle, he falls asleep for
periods, after which he wakes
up and is told that he has committed crimes of seduction and
oppression, and later that he has murdered the seduced girl
and killed his own mother; yet he has no recollection of havin8 done any of these things. The first hypothesis which is
likely to suggest itself to the reader is that the Devil, GilMartin, has impersonated Robert during his sleep, and that
this impersonation, not Robert, has committed the crimes.
However, this hypothesis soon runs into a snag: Robert's
personal servant, Scrape, is convinced that Robert has not
been asleep in his bed all the time (p. 187). Some other
hypothesis is therefore needed. Either an alien personality
has invaded Robert's body and used it without his knowing, or
more probably Robert's own mind has undergone so radical a
split that two distinct personalities alternately inhabit his
body, and the permanent or dominant one has no memory of the
actions of the occasional intervener, which it knows of
from the witness of others. 8 ~ore will be said about this
below.
Starting from his two theological premises, Hogg has constructed a story which can be conveniently divided into three
parts, each having its own didactic purpose. First there is a
story of successful usurpation through murder; second there is
a story of almost successful revenge; and third there is a
narrative of persecution ending in suicide. From the point of
view of the devil, who is the chief manipulator throughout,
these are three phases of a single plot aiming at the eternal
ruin of Robert Wringhim's soul.
Of the three parts, the first and longest is probably
modelled on the ancient story of Abraham and his two sons,
which St. Paul uses in connection with his doctrine of predestination (Rom. 9:6-10) and in his polemic against defenders
of the law (Gal. 4:21-30): as Ishmael, the slave, "persecuted" Isaac the freeborn, so Paul's law-observing critics were
persecuting his non-observing disciples (Gal. 4:29), In
Hogg's story, the legitimate son and heir is the law-observer
and the illegitimate Robert \\lringhim is the Antinomian; and in
this case, the illegitimate son's persecution is successful:
he kills his brother and usurps his inheritance. In the
part of the story he is not seen "playing" ,vith his brother or
"mocking" him (Gen. 21:9); on the contrary, he interferes with
his brother's play, but this interference is the occasion of
his first attempt to kill his brother.
Hogg's revision of St. Paul's story conveys, by indirec-
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tion, his criticism of it. In a household where one son is an
observer of law and the other considers himself free from law,
it is the lawless one who will feel free to drive out and dispossess the
one. Paul uses the story to incite
his non-law-observing Gentile converts to expel from their
churches Jewish and/or Gentile Christians who observe the law
of Moses. Abraham's expulsion of
and Ishmael, which Paul
holds up as a model, was in fact equivalent to a death sentence: driven out into the desert, the mother and child were
in danger of death until an angel of God intervened to save
them (Gen. 21:
St. Paul's anathemas against the defenders of law may have been meant to expose them of some kind
of bodily harm (cf. I Cor. 5:5). The roots of Antinomian intolerance and oppression are in the Pauline Epistles themselves. Hogg's book, as will be shown below, is much more in
the spirit of Jesus (cf. Mt. 13:28-30 and 13:41); he does not
urge his readers to root out the cockle of lawlessness or to
persecute the Antinomians but rather to understand and pity
them. He himself, in writing the book, is showing them how
dangerous is their error, both to themselves and to the peace
of society.
The first effect of Robert's full commitment of himself to
Antinomianism is that it draws upon him the special attention
of the devil. This begins on the very
when he allows himself to be convinced that he is absolutely predestined. (It
may seem to be a defect in the novel that Robert achieves this
conviction simply
accepting the word of Robert Wringhim Sr.
without any argument or personal experience; however, in this
Hogg is true to life. Joseph Cottle observed that the followers of Dr. Hawker believed themselves to be the predestined
elect simply and
because Dr. Hawker told them so and
they found it
to believe him.) The reasons why
Antinomianism attracts diabolic attention are two: by undermining respect for law and fear of sanctions after death it
weakens two bulwarks which normally
temptation at bay;
and secondly, there is a natural kinship between the devil and
the Antinomian, since both believe that their eternal
is already fixed and cannot be altered
conduct good or bad.
The devil knows that Antinomianism is false, but he is glad to
propogate it because it makes its adherents amenable to his
solicitations. 9
After Robert has allowed himself to be persuaded, at the
age of eighteen, that he is absolutely and unconditionally
predestined to eternal glory, even the sins mentioned in
Revelation (22:15) as excluding sins lose some of their terror
for him, and he is soon induced to commit murder. Antinomianism can easily provide specious grounds for murder. To preach
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against moralistic Christianity is a waste of time if predestination is as absolute as St. Paul says in his parable of
the Potter (Rom. 9:21-23). If people are predestined one way
or the other before they are born. the only way to make the
doctrine of
ication-by-faith prevail is to kill off the
preachers of morality (pp. 122-23). It is on these grounds
that Robert Wringhim consents to join in the murder of
Blanchard. the exponent of law-observing Christianity. After
committing murder once. Robert finds that it is much easier to
do it again. He allows himself to be persuaded that if the
property of Dalcastle were in his own hands. he could use it
in the cause of true religion; on these grounds he consents to
murder his brother, and he succeeds at his third attempt; next
he consents to murder his father--who. however. dies as a result of the shock of his elder son's death, without any
further intervention by Robert; and finally he consents to
murder his mother.
Hogg does not say that embracing Antinomianism immediately
makes a man reckless. Common sense will raise its voice; like
anyone else. the Antinomian may lack the courage of his convictions; and he will continue to fear the sanctions of civil
law. To lead Robert into crime, Gil-Martin has to promise him
security from natural as well as supernatural sanctions and to
convince him by experience that he has power to fulfill this
promise (p. 142).
To the end, Robert retains his fear of the sins of idolatry
and
He finally commits these sins, but not
because he is convinced that he can do so with impunity. GilMartin
him an equivocal prayer for use in a situation of
extremity (p. 238); Robert fears to use it, not because it is
explicitly blasphemous, but because its ambiguity may conceal
a sin of
(perhaps: "To him whom I serve I surrender
my soul without reservation for ever!,,).lO Near the end, to
gain release from extreme torments, Robert utters the tremendous prayer, but with an uneasy conscience. When he finally takes his life, he knows that he is doing wrong but does it
to escape from torments worse than hell and in the hope that
his tormentor will fall along with him (p.
In the end,
therefore, the Antinomian is driven to commit the very worst
of sins.
Thirdly, Antinomianism is shown to lead to peculiar disassociations of personality. In addition to the form mentioned
above (between the waking and sleeping
ties) there is
the strange malady which Robert experiences even before he
commits his first murder:
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I generally conceived myself to be two people. Hhen
I lay in bed, I deemed there were two of us in it;
when I sat up, I always beheld another person, and
always in the same position from the place where I
sat or stood, which was about three paces off me
towards my left side •..• Over the singular delusion
that I was two persons, my reasoning faculties had
no power. The most perverse part of it was, that
I rarely conceived
to be any of the two persons. I thought for the most part that my companion
was one of them, and my brother the other; and I
found that to be obliged to
and answer in the
character of another man, was a most awkward business
at the long run.
(p. 154)
The hypothesis which this passage at once suggests is that
Robert's antinomian beliefs are causing him, during his waking
hours, to identify with Gil-Martin the part of himself of
which he approves, and to project into an image of his brother
the part of himself of which he disapproves. There is a snag:
Robert's brother George experiences a similar thing at the
same time: his brother Robert is always at his side within a
few yards (p. 36)--and this cannot be attributed to Antinomianism. However, the snag is not fatal. The two cases are
similar but not identical. Robert feels himself to be two
persons, whereas George never identifies the figure that
haunts him as a part of himself. In George's case, on most
occasions the figure must be a demonic impersonation (at the
tennis and cricket matches and at Arthur's Seat Robert himself
is present; in the intervening time, while Robert is confined
to his room, George is beset by a demonic impersonation of
Robert); in Robert's case, the George-like
appears to
be a dissociated part of Robert himself--though the dissociation is due to demonic influence as well as to psychological
causes.
Hogg may have arrived at the notion of this strange malady
simply by reflecting that if the reality of a man's conduct
is
at variance with his splendid self-image, he is
likely to suffer serious psychological problems. However, an
easier supposition is that he arrived at it by reflecting on
some passages in the
to the Romans where St. Paul uses
a primitive two-man psychology to contrast the condition of
the unjustified sinner with that of the justified. He talks
of the "old man" and the "inner man" as living in an uneasy
marriage within each individual until the old man (who lives
under the law) dies in baptism and leaves the inner man free
to enter into marriage with Christ and live the life of the
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Spirit (Rom. 7: 1-16).11 A little later, he gives his well
known description of the dissociation that tears apart the
personality of the sinner (Rom. 7:14-20), a description which
doubtless owes something to his own spiritual experiences at
some time of his life.
Again perhaps the psychological origin of the disorder is
less significant than the devil's purpose in manipulating it.
The devil's purpose with Robert is to make him believe that he
is bewitched by his relations according to the flesh, so that
he will thirst to be revenged upon them (p.
His purpose
in haunting
with an impersonation of Robert is to isolate George from his friends, so that Robert can attack him
when he is alone at Arthur's Seat.
As was mentioned above, after Robert has entered into possession of Dalcastle, he begins to suffer from a new and deeper form of dissociation, his personality splitting into two
parts between which there is no communication. This is so far
from common experience that most readers probably seek to explain it to themselves as being the result of diabolical impersonation; however, this explanation runs into insuperable
difficulties; and in fact, alternations of personality within
the same man do occur and are documented in psychiatric literature. The theoretical possibility of such alternations was
discussed by John Locke in his Essay on Human
(1690), which
had probably read, but Locke does not appear to know of any actual cases. He argues that personal
identity consists not in identity of substance but in identity
of consciousness. That is why
to punish Socrates waking for what
Socrates
thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of,
would be no more of right, than to punish one twin
for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing,
because their outsides were so like, that they could
not be distinguished; for such twins have been seen. 12
Locke goes on to consider the speculative
same man might have two waking personalities
in him.
But if it be possible for the same man to have
distinct incommunicable consciousness at different
times, it is past doubt the same man would at
different times make different persons; which, we
see, is the sense of mankind in the solemnest
declaration of their opinions, human laws not
punishing the madman for the sober man's actions,

with-
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nor the sober man for what the mad man did,
making them two persons.
In the story of Robert Wringhim after he has entered into possession of Dalcastle,
has created the case
of a
man who has two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses at
different times. What he experiences during the
"sleeps"
of his normal personal
might perhaps be classed as a spontaneous hypnotic trance.
The second phase of the devE's plot against Robert Hringhim has the pattern of an Elizabethan revenge
invented
by Thomas Kyd in The
Tragedy and adapted by Shakespeare in Ha~let. I n ' s story, the avenger is Miss Logan,
old George Colwan's buxom mistress, herself one of the lesser
victims of Robert's persecution of young George. From the
hour of old Colwan's death she suspects the
of being
responsible for y o u n g ' s death; a long time
before she learns from Bell Calvert the identity of the murderer.
She then obtains the
witness of the man who was
with Bell at the time of the murder; thereupon she seeks
vengeance through the law, and an arresting party is sent to
Dalcastle to seize Robert Wringhim. At this point, the normal
pattern of the revenge story is abandoned:
thanks to a disguise provided by Gil-~artin, Robert escapes through the midst
of the arresting party.
Throughout this part of the action, Miss Logan believes
that she is acting on her own initiative and
a good
purpose. The reader, however, knows that unwittingly she is
being used as a tool of the devil's purpose. It was GilMartin who prevented Robert Hringhim from murdering Miss Logan
(p. 173) and who
that there should be two eye-witnesses of the slaying of George.
This part of the story conveys a lesson about revenge and
forgiveness: a well-meaning person who takes upon herself or
himself the task of
revenge, even through
channels, may unawares be
the work of the devil. ~iss Logan
is inconsistent in the matter of mercy and revenge. At first
she rejects Bell Calvert's
for mercy; then she tries to
make a deal with her, which is rejected; but f
, in court,
she is moved to pity and refuses to incriminate Bell--with the
result that she retrieves her property and gets the information she wanted. But she does not allow herself to pity or
forgive Robert Hringhim; unawares she does what the devil
wants. By contrast, in the first part of the story, when
George Colwan feels pity for Robert and resolves to seek a
reconciliation, George is blessed for it: he goes up to
Arthur's Seat in joyful communion with nature. As David
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Eggenschwiler pointed out in a valuable article,
in his forgiveness and generosity, which his brother
had not deserved, George experienced a unity that
was manifested as a unity of all things. The thesis
of the little scene is Blakean: the forgiveness of
sins is the way back to wholeness, to a resurrection
of the fallen
and a transformation of the
natural world.
This critic is right: the novel is very much concerned with
the pity and forgiveness to be shown to Antinomians.
During the final phase of the story, Robert is hunted from
place to place, persecuted by demons and protected from them
Gil-Martin. The
demons have their counterpart in
the theology and perhaps in the experience of St. Paul, who
believed that the law of Hoses was given, not by God himself,
but by angels of dubious allegiance who resent the termination
of their control. At the beginning of the
to the
Galatians (1:8), when Paul anathematizes any angel that
preaches a gospel other than his own, he may well be thinking
of the angels of the law mentioned later in the same Epistle
(3:19). From Robert's point of view, in the last phase of
his autobiography, he, the defender of freedom from law, is
being assailed by demonic powers who want to prevent the dissemination of his doctrine.
Gil-Martin at this time continues to pose as Robert's defender, though he is defending him from his own subjects--his
kingdom is divided against itself. But the obvious lesson of
this part of the story is that the security which the devil
promises to his own is equivocal and illusory. "No human
hand," Gil-Martin said, "shall ever henceforth be able to
injure your life" (p. 165). Like Macbeth, Robert learns at
the end that he has been duped by a juggling fiend that
with a double sense. 15
Hogg's chief didactic purpose becomes even clearer when his
narrative technique is examined. The bulk of the story is
narrated twice--first by a third-person narrator of limited
omniscience, and then by a first-person narrator who is not
wholly reliable.
The fictional "Editor" tries to tell the story as it was
in popular tradition, in parish
and in
justiciary records (pp. 1 and 92); however, before writing it,
he has already studied the contents of the rediscovered
"Memoir." In his own narrative, he is therefore trying deliberately to limit his own much greater knowledge. It is
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not clear that he altogether succeeds: it is hard to believe
that popular tradition could retain all the detail of what
passed between Miss Logan and Bell Calvert (e.g., pp. 82-85).
However, the Editor's professed aim is to let the reader know
the story as
in popular "history" before he reveals
the inside story. Popular history or tradition is, of its
nature, incomplete and unreliable; the inside story will help
to correct it.
However, the inside story or autobiography of Robert
Wringhim is itself not completely reliable. He gives his own
inaccurate version of each of his three attempts to kill his
brother
the tennis court, at King Arthur's Seat,
and at the
green. 16 Moreover, the Memoir
towards the end from a retrospective autobiography to a current diary, and the implied judgment changes. Robert writes
his autobiography proper at a time when he is still wedded to
Antinomianism and plans to propagate his views at Oxford. In
the diary section, he comes to recognize that his supposed
friend is his greatest enemy, and he sees the tragedy of his
fate (pp. 227 and 238).
One possible explanation of Hogg's use of the twofold narrative is that it is part of an elaborate strategy to create
the illusion of historicity. However, there are fairly obvious snags in this explanation which need not be dwelt on here.
More probably Hogg wished to put his reader through an educative experience. While reading the Editor's Narrative, having
an imperfect understanding of what is going on, the reader
will feel that Robert Wringhim is a malicious villain, a
religious hypocrite, an unforgiving prig, a fratricial murderer, and in general a detestable character. Then, as he goes
through Robert's own memoir, the reader will revise his harsh
judgment: he will understand the workings of Robert's mind
and see him as an object of pity rather than of hatred--because he is the victim of his education and of the devil. The
reader will end up holding Antinomianism in abhorrence, but
pitying, not
, those who embrace it. 17
One of the valuable effects of any tragic story or play is
to teach us by experience that our initial,
response to
a sinner may be unjust or unkind; if we could understand the
workings of his mind and the intensity of the provocations to
which he was subjected, we should judge him more gently. The
purpose of Hogg's twofold narration is to provide us with an
instructive experience of this kind. The
that his
story was revised and improved by his friend John Gibson
Lockhart has been sufficiently disposed of by Louis Simpson,
but it is
that Hogg's book owes something to Lockhart's example. In 1822, shortly before Hogg wrote his
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Sinner. Lockhart published Some
in the Life
of Mr. Adam Blair, which is similar in overall structure and
purpose: half of the novel explains how an exemplary parish
clergyman comes to the point of committing adultery; the rest
describes the repercussions of the sin upon the sinners; the
whole is designed to inhibit condemnatory judgments and to
make the reader look upon Adam Blair with understanding and
pity.
The most questionable aspect of Hogg's novel considered as
a vehicle of instruction is the employment of demonic impersonations to scare the reader out of all sympathy with Antinomianism. Since Hogg himself clearly does not believe that
such impersonations ever occur in the real world, he is in
effect
falsehood to overthrow falsehood, or using deception to establish truth.
In Shakespeare's time, the belief that spirits, good and
bad, may assume human forms or impersonate particular individuals, living or dead, was common. It is accepted, for example,
by King James in his
(1597).18 Marlowe exploits
i t in Dr. Faustus, Spenser in his Faerie Queene, and even
Shakespeare in some of his plays--though it has been conjectured that Shakespeare has misgivings about the legitimacy of
well intentioned deceits. 19
The last page of the novel shows that Hogg was uneasy about
what he had written. Having exploited the popular superstition throughout the novel, he seems to realize that his story,
if taken as history, will confirm, at least in simple minds,
a superstition which he himself does not accept. Therefore,
in spite of all his previous efforts to create the illusion of
historicity, he finally calls the whole in question. He makes
the Editor say: "With the present generation, it will not go
down, that a man should be daily tempted by the devil, in the
semblance of a fellow creature," and he ends by suggesting
that the author of the Memoir was "a religious maniac, who
wrote and wrote about a deluded creature, till he arrived at
the height of madness, that he believed himself the very object whom he had been all along describing" (p. 254). The
suggestion is, of course, false: the Memoir was made up by
Hogg, to scare people away from Antinomianism. He wants them
to think it true while reading it, but finally, perhaps as a
further measure of self-protection against criticism, he inserts a warning that it is not true. By so doing, he does not,
at a stroke, destroy the book's didactic value. Myths influence the minds even of those who disbelieve them. 2G

of

Doctrinal Premises

Hogg's Justified Sinner

163

NOTES
lAndre Gide's Introduction to the Cresset Press edition
(London, 1947), p. ix. The edition quoted in this article is
the one by John Carey in The World's Classics (Oxford, 1981);
page references are inserted in the text.
Gifford, James Hogg (Edinburgh, 1976), p. 179.
3The
James Version here has "Christ is the end of the
law," but the definite article is not in the Greek: Christos
telos nomou. (For all further quotations from Scripture the
KJV will be used; references are inserted in the text.)
4Cf. Walter Rauschenbusch, Christim~ity and the Social

Crisis (1907; rpt. New York, 1964), p. 102 •
• W.M. Hetherington, History
the Church
pp. 206-08.
Marrow was first published in 1645 and
frequently reissued. The 19th edition (Montrose) was issued
in 1803.

6The Marrow (Edinburgh, 1761), pp. 131-33.
7Joseph Cottle, Strictures on the Plymouth Antinomians, 2nd
edn. (London, 1824), pp. 2, 48 and 154.
8 Robert himself entertains these two
but without
between them.
9 In the same way, Robert is willing to
respect for law, when it suits him to do so.

(p. 182)
to George's
See p. 22.

lOOn p. 138, Gil-Martin uses "The God whom thou servest"
equivocally.
lID.
"James Hogg's
and the Fall
into Division," SSL, 9 (1972), p. 28, observes that in the
opening scenes between Lord and Lady Da1cast1e we have "a
metaphysical domestic farce, which represents the division of
man's self as marital squabbles."
12 John Locke, An
York, 1959), p. 460.
on pp. 460-61.

Concerning Human Understanding (New
The other passage quoted from Locke is
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13William James, The
of Psychology (New York,
1950), p. 392, mentions such a trance lasting two months.
1 "Eggenschwiler, op. cit., p. 30.
150n the frequent use of equivocation in the Memoir see
Ian Campbell, "Hogg's Confessions and The Heart of Darkness,"
SSL, 15 (1980), pp. 192-3.
16 Cf • L. Simpson, James Hogg~ A Critical Study (London and
Edinburgh, 1962). p. 183.
l7CL Douglas Gifford, James Hogg, p. 162: "The very jailer of Robert's prison suddenly shines through the tormented
account to remind us that this lunatic is a 'ca11ant.' a poor
adolescent to be pitied, however sick and dangerous he may
be."
1
B. Harrison (ed.), King James the First~ Daemonologie
and NeUJes from Scotland (New York. 1966), pp. 60-1 and 66-9.
19 Phi1ip Edwards, "Shakespeare and the Healing Power of
Deceit. ff Shakespeare Survey, 31 (1978), p. 124.
20 Cf • J.B.S. Haldane, Possible Worlds and Other Papers
(1928; rpt. New York, 1971), p. 247.

